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Abstract 
In Lesotho the adoption of the new constitution in 1993 made provision for local development. These 
constitutional provisions were only operationalised in 1997 through an Act of parliament (Local 
Government Act 1997). The question of how functions are assigned between the central and local 
governments has always been an area of dispute. The Act attempted to demarcate the assignments 
through the Schedules to the Act which embody the functions of local authorities at various levels – 
community councils, urban councils and district councils. However, local development and service 
delivery continue by and large to be undertaken by central government despite the demarcation. The 
purpose of this paper, therefore, is to critically analyse the challenges of assignment of functions to 
local authorities in Lesotho. The paper contends that as the assignment of functions is integral to 
decentralisation in Lesotho, intergovernmental relations and assignment of functions should be 
incorporated into the country’s constitution. 
 
Introduction  
There is arguably no aspect of decentralisation since the promulgation of the Local Government Act in 
1997, which has been more daunting and complex than the process of assigning functions between 
central and local governments in Lesotho. This process has not been realised effectively in Lesotho 
except for a few line ministries that haphazardly conceded to hand some of their functions to local 
authorities. When the country enacted the Local Government Act, the process of the assignment of 
functions was short-circuited by annexing two Schedules to the Act which embody the purported 
functions of local authorities.  
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This has done little to assist in the decentralisation of certain formerly centralised functions. There are 
two main challenges with the Schedules.  First, they are still too general to guide line ministries on the 
functions that rightfully belong to the sub-national level. Consequently, line ministries are largely left 
unguided on what functions to retain and what to relinquish. Secondly, and most importantly, the 
Schedules do not encompass revenue and expenditure functions. In turn, they have created empty hopes 
on the side of local government. Most of the developmental functions that have been envisaged remain 
without resources so that they largely constitute ‘unfunded mandates’.  The adoption of the National 
Decentralisation Policy in 2014 (Government of Lesotho 2014), has injected fresh impetus to the 
decentralisation reforms in Lesotho. It provides another opportunity to attempt the exercise of assigning 
functions to local authorities under the broader new policy regime.  The purpose of this paper is, 
therefore, to recast the whole notion of assignment of functions into the current reform processes. By 
so doing, the paper hopes to lay bare some of the challenges of this exercise in the past, and make some 
contributions on how it can be improved under the new policy regime. 
Background to decentralisation in Lesotho 
Decentralisation in Lesotho is arguably as old as the formation of the nation-state in the 19th century.  
Since then the country has experienced localised forms of democracy associated with traditional 
leadership under the system of chieftainship embedded in local governance processes (Mahao 1993). 
This system was disrupted with the advent of democracy in the 1930s when the institution of chieftaincy 
was gazetted (Machobane 1986), and later in the 1960s when an attempt was made at electing district 
councils, thereby infusing elective conceptions into the system of local governance.  Since then, due 
largely to changing political situations in the country, local governance has oscillated between 
traditionalist, elective and appointive constructs.  
Thus, Lesotho is traditionally a decentralised state where every village or ward has had a traditional 
administration of one form or another (Mofuoa 2005). The post-independence institutional designs 
placed a lot of pressure on traditional administration to the extent that it – perhaps in tandem with all 
other native processes – showed some signs of inadequacy.  The introduction in the 1960s of the elective 
principle in local governance also confirmed that a new attitude towards local democracy in Lesotho 
was on the upsurge. However, the concept of democracy could not be sustained, largely because of its 
rudimentary stage at the time. Instead of re-energising traditional administration, the country introduced 
the appointive principle in local administration in the late 1980s to early 1990s at a stage when the 
country was en route to democracy again. The idea of development councils at village and ward levels 
in the 1990s underscored this particular trajectory.   
When the country returned to electoral democracy in 1993, local democracy followed in 1997 when the 
country re-introduced the elective principle to local governance through the Local Government Act of 
1997. There has been widespread disagreement about the model of decentralisation introduced by the 
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Act. The divergence of views has been whether the country, through this design, was devolving, 
delegating or de-concentrating functions to local governance. This debate has arisen largely out of a 
lack of clarity about the powers of the elected councils vis-à-vis the central government. While the 
Ministry of Local Government expects line ministries to devolve powers based on the Schedules to the 
Local Government Act, this belief has not necessarily been shared by ministries at central level. Most 
of the ministries continue to maintain ‘de-concentrated’ presence at district and, at times, community 
level.    
At present, the country operates a local government structure which has four types of local authorities: 
community councils, district councils, urban councils and a municipal council (Table 1).  
Table 1: Types and number of local authorities in Lesotho 
District  No. of District 
Councils 
No. of Municipal 
Councils 
No. of Urban 
Councils 
No. of 
Community 
Councils 
1. Berea 1 0 1 8 
2. Butha-Buthe 1 0 1 4 
3. Leribe  1 0 2 11 
4. Mafeteng 1 0 1 7 
5. Maseru 1 1 (Maseru City Council) 1 10 
6. Mohale’s Hoek 1 0 1 7 
7. Mokhotlong 1 0 1 4 
8. Qacha’s Nek 1 0 1 3 
9. Quthing 1 0 1 5 
10. Thaba-Tseka 1 0 1 5 
Total 10 1 11 64 
Source: Adapted from Lesotho Local Government Act 1997 (as amended) 
The community council is the basic unit of local government in Lesotho and number 64 in total. The 
members of the community council directly represent a single-member electoral division (ED); 
however, the ED is not necessarily a local government structure despite the fact that it covers a sizeable 
population in a community council. District councils are indirectly elected and made up of members 
nominated from every community council in the district. All ten administrative districts in Lesotho have 
district councils. Urban councils govern the 11 selected urban centres across the country and unlike 
district councils, are directly elected. The last type of local authority is the sole municipality based in 
Maseru city. 
The challenge with this structure is that it is still not ‘local enough’ (Kapa 2009). The community 
council which is the basic unit of the structure serves too many villages and some villages struggle to 
establish efficient relationships with the community council. The ideal situation would be for local 
government to have a local authority in every village.  
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Since the return of the country to electoral democracy, two local government elections have been held 
in 2005 and 2011. Throughout this period, emphasis has been placed on political decentralisation during 
the preliminary stages in the decentralisation process.  Despite the large emphasis placed on ‘political 
processes’, there are some indications that local government in Lesotho is bracing for the second wave 
– the stage where local government would be given power to control its own resources, although 
population sizes differ (Table 2). This stage involves independent mobilisation of resources by local 
authorities, independent budgetary powers and control of facilities under which they would have the 
power to impose local taxes and collect local revenues (Hountondji and Fournier 2007) as accounting 
authorities in their own right. The local government regime in Lesotho has not yet reached this stage 
but there is every indication that this will soon be realised.  
The Deepening Decentralisation Programme by the government of Lesotho in collaboration with 
European Union (EU), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Capital 
Development Fund (UNCDF), has as one of its key outputs the establishment of a local development 
fund which will transfer revenue from central government to local government. While doing so, the 
programme aims to create capacity at the local level to collect, receive and manage revenue. Clearly it 
would seem that the government has already realised that in order to graduate to this stage certain macro 
reforms will be necessary. The government is responding by starting the process of developing the 
decentralisation policy which will be the bedrock for all the reforms.  
While the country will be working on its move to the second stage of decentralisation, it will be 
imperative to concurrently consider the third stage – that of local economic development. This is clearly 
an advanced stage of decentralisation where there is economic activity at the local level – the regulation 
of markets, participation of the private sector, economic regulations and frameworks, and production 
etc. (Hountondji and Fournier 2007). This stage has its own reversals – negative tendencies like 
corruption, nepotism and cronyism are normally endemic during this period.  
Table 2: Present local government structures by area and population   
District Area (km2) 
 
Population                       
(2006 Census) 
No. of Councils 
1. Butha-Buthe  1,767 110,320 6 
2. Leribe   2,828 293,369 14 
3. Berea  2,222 250,006 10 
4. Maseru   4,279 393,154 13 
5. Mafeteng   2,119 192,621 9 
6. Mohale’s  Hoek  3,530 176,928 9 
7. Quthing  2,916 124,048 7 
8. Qacha’s Nek  2,349 69,749 5 
9. Thaba-Tseka    4,270 129,881 7 
10. Mokhotlong      4,075 97,713 6 
Total 30,355 1,876,633 86 
Source: Adapted from Lesotho Decentralisation Policy (Government of Lesotho 2014) 
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The notion of functional assignment  
Assignment of functions across various spheres of government is fundamental to any decentralisation 
programme. It is the precondition for decentralisation and an issue for both federal and unitary states.  
When a country considers decentralising, the first thing is to decide on the scale of sub-national units, 
setting organisational structures, and deciding on inter-governmental fiscal relationships (Ferrazzi and 
Rohdewohld 2009).  The UN Guidelines on Decentralisation provide that “legislative provisions and 
legal texts should clearly articulate the roles and responsibilities of local authorities vis-à-vis higher 
spheres of government” (UN 2007, C.1.4).  Assignment of functions generally happens in countries 
despite the model or typology of decentralisation. Countries choose to decentralise using various 
models, the most common of which are delegation, devolution and de-concentration.  
There has been little disagreement with regard to the process of delegation. As Cohen and Peterson 
(1996, p. 11) pointedly argue, delegation refers to the “transfer of government decision-making and 
administrative authority and/or responsibility for carefully spelled out tasks to institutions and 
organizations that are either under its indirect control or independent”. In many cases delegation “is 
by the central government to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the government 
but legally accountable to it”. Clearly, this type of decentralisation is not the one envisaged by the 
current local government regime in Lesotho. The contest is, rather, between devolution and de-
concentration. Devolution is concerned more with the transfer of political power since authority is 
transferred by central governments to the local level. The sub-national or local authorities to which 
power has been transferred are governed by locally elected representatives – they are not necessarily 
agents of branches of central government (Conyers 1983). The process of devolution is normally more 
straightforward in federal or semi-federal states where the centre is clearly not in charge of the regions 
or communes.  Unitary states like Lesotho do not normally provide good examples of government with 
devolved powers (Salmon 1999). On the other hand, de-concentration – which is common in British-
based local government regimes – is not necessarily based on locally elected political representatives. 
Power is simply transferred from the centre to the local branches of government, and the centre has 
direct control over the localised branches (Schou and Haug 2005). This is commonly referred to as 
administrative decentralisation. 
What becomes immediately apparent with the Lesotho design is that it does not fall squarely into either 
of these two designs. While indeed the local authorities are directly elected, there is still a lot of power 
and influence from the centre – which makes it hard for this process to be called devolution. The powers 
of local authorities according to section 106 of the constitution are determined not by the constitution 
but by central government at its own volition. Thus, by virtue of having locally elected representatives, 
Lesotho local government design could conveniently be styled semi-devolution – not de-concentration 
because it is not made up of branches or agencies of central government, strictly speaking.  It should be 
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noted however, that despite local authorities being elective in Lesotho they are largely viewed as, or 
indeed are, agents or branches of central government. 
Assignment of functions to local authorities normally focuses on three basic typologies of function – 
administrative functions, political functions and fiscal functions. Administrative decentralisation mostly 
relates to human resource, planning and management. It deals largely with the administration of local 
authorities. Political decentralisation, on the other hand, gives political powers to sub-national levels of 
government. When a country decentralises political functions, “representative institutions at sub-
national level exert some autonomous political role in undertaking functions and managing resources” 
(Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2009, p. 3). These sub-national institutions are oftentimes elected at the 
national level.  The third typology of function pertains to fiscal decentralisation. It relates to assignment 
of revenue and expenditure functions to the sub-national level. In deciding which functions to relinquish 
several principles guide countries, such as economies of scale, externalities, equity, heterogeneity of 
demands etc. However, the widely applied principle in functional assignment is subsidiarity which 
dictates that the functions or tasks in question should be undertaken by the layer with the smallest 
jurisdiction that can do so efficiently and effectively (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2009; UNDP 2005).   
The state of functional assignment in Lesotho  
The nature of the model of decentralisation and the corollary assignment of functions can best be 
understood from the constitution of the country. Section 106 of the constitution empowers parliament 
to establish local authorities in order “to enable urban and rural communities to determine their affairs 
and to develop themselves”. Unlike in other countries where the assignment of powers and functions to 
various spheres of government is a constitutional matter, the constitution of Lesotho does not 
necessarily deal with the assignment of functions to local authorities. Assignment of functions is a 
matter for legislation. The Local Government Act of 1997 is the organic piece of legislation on 
decentralisation and local governance in Lesotho. The Act establishes political structures in the form of 
councils that are elected directly by the citizenry.  The legislative powers of these councils are limited 
to making by-laws (s 42) but subject to approval by the minister (s 44). Section 5 of the Act, although 
it is couched in fairly broad terms, is instructive on the powers of local authorities in Lesotho. Section 
5(1) provides that: 
...every local authority shall, subject to the powers reserved to or vested in any other 
authority by this Act or by any other written law, be the authority within its administrative 
limits charged with the regulation, control and administration of all matters as set out in 
the First Schedule. 
In terms of section 5(2) of the Act, community councils perform exclusively the functions in the Second 
Schedule.  The section is fairly permissive on what the local authorities can or cannot do. The functions 
are demarcated in terms of the two Schedules attached to the Act in section 5 (see Table 3 below). 
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Table 3: Assignment of functions to local authorities, section 5 of the Local Government Act 1977 
Schedule         Functions Competent Council  
1  Control of natural resources  
 Public health  
 Physical planning 
 Land/site allocation  
 Minor roads 
 Grazing control  
 Water supply in the village 
 Markets 
 Promotion of economic development 
 Streets and public places  
 Burial grounds  
 Parks and gardens  
 Control of building permits  
 Fire 
 Education 
 Recreation and culture 
 Roads and traffic 
 Water resources 
 Fencing 
 Local administration of central regulations and 
licences 
 Care of mothers, young children, the aged 
and  integration of people with disabilities 
 Laundries 
 Omnibus terminals 
 Mortuaries and burial of destitute persons and 
unclaimed bodies 
 Public decency and offences against public 
order 
 Agriculture: services for improvement of 
agriculture 
 Forestry: preservation improving and control 
of designated forests in the local authority 
area 
 Every local authority within 
its jurisdiction 
2  Control of natural resources (e.g. sand, 
stones) and environmental protection (e.g. 
dongas, pollution) 
 Land/site allocation 
 Minor roads (also bridle paths) 
 Water supply in villages (maintenance) 
 Markets (provision and regulation) 
 Burial grounds 
 Community councils 
Source: Schedules to the Local Government Act, No 6 of 1997 (as amended) 
There is an advantage in taking this general competence approach in constructing the powers of the 
local authorities – but there are also disadvantages.  The advantage is that local authorities are given 
sufficient scope to do generally everything within their area of jurisdiction. However, the disadvantage 
is that when the functions of local authorities are assigned in general terms, it leaves room for 
misunderstanding and abuse. The net effect becomes stagnation in the process of decentralisation – the 
central government remain suspicious about the capabilities of the local authorities. Similarly, local 
governments become beholden to central government about what they can or cannot do. As it could be 
observed from Table 3 above, the Schedules do not specify the extent to which a local authority can 
deliver or execute a certain function. For instance, local authorities are empowered to administer 
’Nyane Assignment of functions to local authorities in Lesotho 
 
 CJLG December 2016 65 
 
education. The Schedules do not necessarily differentiate between various levels of education – 
university, secondary, primary or pre-school.  In the end, the central government retains powers to 
control, administer and deliver education services in all these levels of education. The same applies 
with roads, agriculture, and forestry and even water resources.  
This general competence approach used in the Lesotho design is normally juxtaposed with ultra vires 
(beyond legal limits).  This approach provides a list of functions that can be executed by local authorities 
and those that can be executed by the central government with some level of specificity.  The net effect 
is that no sphere of government can encroach into the jurisdictional authority of the other for that will 
be clearly be ultra vires or beyond the law (Ferrazzi and Rohdewohld 2009). In Lesotho’s design the 
disadvantage is that there are no clear legal boundaries to prohibit one sphere of government from 
encroaching into the jurisdiction of the other in as far as service delivery is concerned. The design 
allows concurrent functional assignment – the assignment of functions in which spheres of government 
share functions and competences. Concurrency in functional assignment is not necessarily a bad thing 
when properly managed. Based on the principle of subsidiarity, the two spheres of government can be 
given competences on one functional area such as roads or agriculture, and the lower level is given 
actual execution and delivery while the higher level is given regulation and standard-setting. 
Another disadvantage with the Schedules, as shown in Table 3, is that they do not assign revenue and 
expenditure functions to local authorities.  While the Act empowers the local authorities to collect 
revenue and expend it, functions are not assigned accordingly between the two spheres of government. 
As a result, revenue collection in all its forms still remains the function of central government. The 
mandates of local authorities, therefore, largely remain unfunded. 
Despite this assignment of functions to local authorities by the Schedules, the central government 
departments have hitherto tenaciously held on to their functions. Central government departments still 
perform service delivery through their de-concentrated departments in the districts. Thus, this 
parallelism between local authorities and de-concentrated central government departments has largely 
stifled local government in Lesotho. Mindful of this reluctance on the side of central government 
departments, the Minister of Local Government in 2015 identified certain central government ministries 
and departments and their functions which would be transferred to local authorities within a period of 
six months, and published the announcement in the Government Gazette, Local Government (Transfer 
of Functions) Regulations, 2015. Table 4 indicates the ministries and the functions to be transferred. 
The only problem with this initiative by the Minister, benevolent as it may seem, is that it effectively 
amends the First Schedule to the principal Act. The Minister purportedly made transfer of functions by 
regulations in terms of sections 5 and 84 of the principal Act. While the Act empowers the Minister 
under section 84 to make regulations “generally for the purpose of giving effect to the principles and 
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provisions of this Act”, it does not empower the Minister to amend the Schedules to the Act. That is still 
the vested function of parliament.  
Table 4: Functions to be transferred by selected central government ministries to local authorities  
Ministry  Functional Area Function to be Transferred 
Health  Health education and promotion  Advocacy 
 Communication  
 Social support  
 School health  
Environmental health   Food hygiene and safety  
 Water, sanitation and hygiene 
 Port health  
 Pollution control 
 Vector and rodent control 
 Housing and building 
 Health care waste management  
Maternal health and child health    Immunisation  
 Integrated management of childhood illnesses  
 Infant and young  
Adolescent health   Peer health education  
 Pre-natal care 
 Integrated school health  
Maternal and child health   Ante-natal care 
 Pre-natal care 
 Post-natal care 
 Prevention of mother to child transmission 
Procurement and supply of 
medicines 
 Medicines and supplies 
 Distribution of preventive medicines and 
supplies 
Communicable and non-
communicable diseases 
 Communicable diseases  
 Non-communicable diseases 
Health legal frameworks and policy 
regulation  
 Implementation of health laws 
Health human resource 
management and information 
system 
 Reporting  
 Planning 
 Data entry and analysis 
 Deployment  
Quality assurance   Compliance  
 Customer services 
Local 
Government 
and 
Chieftainship 
Affairs 
Land tenure  Land acquisition and compensation  
 Land valuation 
 Maintenance of valuation roll 
 Preparation and management of tenancy  
 Assessment and acquisition of immovable 
property  
 Land allocation  
 Land disputes resolution  
Physical planning  Preparation of development plans 
 Building permits  
 Record keeping  
 Collection of spatial data 
Land use planning   Land use plans  
 Socio-economic data for land use plans 
 Develop databases for land use 
Land surveying   Conduct cadastral, topographic and geodetic 
surveys 
 Conduct compensation surveys  
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Ministry of 
Social 
Development 
Social assistance services   Handle queries 
 Receive complaints  
 Conduct initial investigations 
 Inform complainants about outcomes of their 
cases 
 Maintain case records 
 Community mobilisation  
 Train village assistance committees 
Community-based care services  Public awareness on rights of vulnerable 
people 
 Handle cases of abuse of vulnerable groups 
Ministry of 
Forestry 
Forestry development and outreach   Establishment of nursery networks 
 Management of forests 
 Management of orchards 
 Utilisation of forests and forest products 
 Management of cottage industries 
Land management and water 
conservation  
 Planning of soil and water conservation 
operational areas 
 Survey and design of soil and water 
conservation works 
 Construction of soil and water structures 
 Rehabilitation of marginal lands 
Management of rangeland resource  Promotion of community-based natural 
resources management  
 Adjudication of cattle posts 
 Management and protection of wetland areas 
Ministry of 
Energy 
 Inspection and licensing of petroleum products  
 Registration of electricity schemes 
Source: Local Government (Transfer of Functions) Regulations No 138 of 2015 
Despite this statutory intervention by the Minister, transfer of functions to the local authorities in 
Lesotho is still very low. Even in those ministries that are making some attempt to transfer functions, 
resources such as finances and human resources are still retained by the central government to the extent 
that transfer of these functions ultimately becomes an exercise in futility. 
Overview of fiscal decentralisation in Lesotho   
Conceptually, fiscal decentralisation is the concomitant of the now widely accepted wave of 
decentralisation across the globe. It therefore subscribes to the broader theories of decentralisation 
whose essence is that decentralisation leads to higher levels of political participation, accountability, 
administrative and fiscal efficiency (Falleti 2005; Inter-American Development Bank 1994). Countries 
have differed materially on how they decentralise public financial management. The difference has 
largely depended on the model of decentralisation which a country proposes. Other countries, mainly 
federal and semi-federal countries, have opted for much more devolved powers to the sub-national level 
while unitary states largely maintain vertical uni-polar fiscal relationships between tiers of government. 
Public financial management responsibilities are assigned to various tiers of government but largely 
managed through one central system. Irrespective of the model of decentralisation, every country in 
contemporary country designs has one form of fiscal decentralisation or the other (Faguet 2014). 
In essence, fiscal decentralisation means empowering local and sub-national spheres of government to 
manage their fiscal resources. Due largely to weak local revenue in most instances, fiscal 
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decentralisation has been erroneously equated to transfers from the central government to the periphery. 
Fiscal decentralisation does not exclusively embody intergovernmental transfers – it is broader. Indeed 
the modalities of intergovernmental transfers have occupied a significant space in discussions about 
fiscal decentralisation: 
It is also about the extent to which local governments are empowered, about how much 
authority and control they exercise over the use and management of devolved financial 
resources, measured in terms of their control over (i) the provision of the basket of local 
services for which they are responsible; (ii) the level of local taxes and revenues (base, 
rates and collection); and (iii) the grant resources with which they finance the delivery of 
local public services (UNDP 2005, p. 2). 
In the final analysis, fiscal decentralisation consists primarily of devolving revenue sources and 
expenditure functions to lower tiers of government (de Mello 2000). The four key tenets of fiscal 
decentralisation are: 1) the assignment of expenditure responsibilities to different government levels, 2) 
the assignment of tax and revenue sources to different government levels, 3) intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers and, 4) sub-national borrowing: local governments can borrow (in a variety of ways) to finance 
revenue shortfalls (UNDP 2005). 
Figure 1: Non-tax revenue sources for the year 2013–2014 for district councils 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2016) 
How a particular country assigns these functions across spheres of government has been difficult to 
resolve for most countries, including Lesotho. However, most countries largely use the principle of 
subsidiarity. This principle suggests that government functions should be assigned to the lowest level 
of government that is capable of efficiently undertaking this function (UNDP 2005). For instance, if 
fines for grazing on a reserved pasture can best be collected by local government than the central 
government, the principle provides that such a revenue function should be assigned to the local 
authorities. Similarly, the standard tax revenues such as income tax and other inter-country levies and 
taxes can best be collected by central government, and should therefore be assigned to central 
government.  In Lesotho, the small amount of revenue collected by local authorities is transferred to the 
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local government. Figure 1 above shows the revenue collected by district councils which in turn is not 
utilised at local level but transferred to the central government.  
Admittedly, fiscal decentralisation in Lesotho is still in its infancy and appears to be lagging behind 
administrative and political decentralisation. However, the Local Government Act (1997) empowers 
every council to collect revenue and manage it within its jurisdiction. The revenue collection powers of 
councils seem to be broad enough to include fines and penalties; inter-governmental transfers; rates and 
taxes (s 47). However, no council has been managing any revenue in Lesotho with the exception of 
Maseru City Council (MCC), perhaps because of several factors. The first one is that unlike other 
councils that were only established in 2005, MCC was established in 1989 under the Urban Government 
Act of 1983. So the MCC is older and much more experienced than others. Secondly and still related to 
the first, MCC has much more human resources than other councils. As the International Monetary 
Fund (2016, p. 6) notes: 
With the exception of Maseru City Council LAs do not have a substantive source of own 
revenues. Community and urban councils collect revenues and Maseru City Council 
collects property rates. Only Maseru City Council retains revenues; all other revenues are 
transferred to the district councils and subsequently to the central government. Devolution 
usually entails devolved entities retaining all or part of their own revenues to finance their 
activities and to set/vary the standards (better roads, more nurses etc.) of these activities. 
The restriction on the use of autonomous revenues to 1 out of 86 LA’s is unusual.  In 
addition the property tax collection rate for Maseru for 2014–2015 was Maloti 35 
(collected)/60(owed) million due to the weak enforcement mechanism available to Maseru 
City Council. 
Despite the historical advantage and the preferential treatment given to MCC on revenue sources, its 
management of finances does not seem to be any better than other councils. The MCC has not received 
‘clean audits’ for the past three financial years at least. For the year ending 31st March 2012, the Auditor 
General criticised the MCC’s management of its finances stating that “there were serious deficiencies 
in Council’s accounting and internal controls system during the year” (Auditor General 2016, p. 5).  
In that sense, MCC is arguably at the same financial management stage as the other councils. Under the 
Deepening Decentralisation Programme, which is a five-year (2013–17) project by the Ministry of 
Local Government undertaken with the support of its development partners, councils are assessed 
annually on compliance with certain minimum conditions as the qualification criteria for receiving local 
development grants. In 2015, six minimum conditions and six performance measures were covered. 
Councils were required to meet the following minimum conditions: i) a District Annual Development 
Plan for the current financial year (2015/16) approved by council; ii) a district council in place with a 
schedule of monthly meetings during the previous financial year (2014/15); iii) complete final accounts 
for the previous financial year produced and submitted to the Ministry of Local Government within 
three months after the end of the financial year; iv) unqualified reports on audited accounts for previous 
financial years; v) full-time key district staff with written job descriptions; and vi) an established cash 
book for the local development grant. 
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All the councils, including MCC, have not met the requirement of having “unqualified audited 
accounts” (Government of Lesotho 2015). This state of affairs is indicative of the weak financial 
management at local level. Hence, the new Decentralisation Policy (2014) laments that: 
Financial management in Local Council is manual, making it difficult to create a credible 
PFM system. The treasury considers the current budgeting process in local councils as 
below the required threshold for public expenditure. Without a credible budgeting and 
public expenditure and accounting system, it is difficult to entrust local councils with 
public funds (Government of Lesotho 2014, p. 5). 
For administrative and political decentralisation the country has developed a dedicated legislative 
framework. With the enactment of the Local Government Act in 1997 and Local Government Elections 
Act in 1998, the country has considerably enhanced political decentralisation in Lesotho. These two 
key political decentralisation instruments saw the election of political representatives at local level. In 
a similar manner, the country advanced administrative decentralisation with the promulgation of the 
Local Government Service Act in 2008 – thereby creating a separate service for the local level. The Act 
created the Local Government Service which oversees the recruitment, discipline and dismissal of local 
service staff. While both political and administrative aspects of decentralisation are yet to mature, there 
has been considerable progress; however, fiscal decentralisation has been slower to develop. The local 
authorities still look up to the central government for sources of revenue management, expenditure and 
budget management. This is largely because there is no statutory or policy framework governing fiscal 
decentralisation in Lesotho – unlike those for institutional and administrative aspects of 
decentralisation. 
At most, fiscal decentralisation is scattered in various pieces of legislation which has created 
disharmony and incoherence (UNDP and UNCDF 2013). The Local Government Act 1997 contains 
some content of fiscal decentralisation. The Act empowers local authorities to generate local revenue 
in the form of levies, taxes, fines and grants, to manage expenditure of transfers from the central 
government and even to borrow capital. In this respect the councils are accorded quite broad powers by 
the Act. In a similar manner, the Public Financial Management and Accountability (PFMA) Act 2011, 
has some relevance to fiscal decentralisation. 
Indeed, the ideal would be to have a dedicated Local Financial Management Act. However, the country 
is yet to enact a specialised law for local financial management. In the meantime, regulations 
operationalising both the Local Government Act and the PFMA Act would go a long way to enhance 
fiscal decentralisation.  Notwithstanding this, the country is yet to develop local finance management 
regulations. In instances of inadequate legal infrastructure the central government is doing a lot to shore 
up local financial management in areas such as local revenue collection, grant allocation, major 
expenditure and accountability. Clearly these measures do little to support decentralisation in the bigger 
scheme of things because effectively the central government continues to control financial movements 
at the local level. Consequently, the challenges of accountability, absorptive capacity and inefficiency 
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in service delivery still persist. Despite the existence of local authorities and district and sub-district 
level, the country continues with de-concentrated sub-accountancies at district level. There is little or 
no structural relationship between the councils and the sub-accountancies for the latter largely collect 
revenue and manage expenditures directly on behalf of the central government. Perhaps placing these 
sub-accountancies within the district councils would go a long way not only to enhance local financial 
management but even to buffer intergovernmental fiscal relations. 
The new model proposed by decentralisation policy  
In February 2014 the Government of Lesotho adopted the National Decentralisation Policy with the 
aim of deepening and sustaining grassroots-based democratic governance and promoting equitable local 
development by enhancing citizen participation and strengthening the local government system, while 
maintaining effective functional and mutually accountable linkages between central and local 
government entities. Specifically, the policy provides for the following key strategic reform actions: 
adoption of devolution as the model of decentralised governance and service delivery; establishment of 
local governments with autonomy and executive authority development and implementation of the 
strategic framework for participatory and integrated planning; establishment of fiscal decentralisation 
and prudent public financial management; development of a framework for exercising local autonomy 
and intergovernmental relations (Government of Lesotho 2014). The policy introduces a set of 
decentralisation reforms based on devolution. Whether devolution is an appropriate model for Lesotho 
as a unitary state remains to be seen, but what is clear about the new decentralisation policy is that it 
proposes a decentralisation dispensation where there is mutual respect between spheres of government 
and local autonomy. About nine principles are upheld by the policy with a view to envisage a much 
more autonomous local government. Those principles are participation, subsidiarity, separation of 
powers, local autonomy, non‐subordination, government as a single system or entity, recognising 
diversity within uniformity, inclusive governance and accountability.  
The policy is not specific on the model of assignment of functions, but it can only be deduced from the 
principles of the policy that local autonomy, a subject which has haunted decentralisation in Lesotho 
for a very long time, is central to the newly envisaged dispensation. The policy provides that “the 
government will devolve functions, responsibilities and resources relating to service delivery to local 
governments to the fullest extent possible” (Government of Lesotho 2014, p. 15).  The policy makes a 
general division of responsibilities between central government and local government as thus: 
Under devolution, line ministries in Central Government shall have responsibility for 
initiating and formulating policies and national strategies, work with local governments 
to set targets and prepare sectoral budgets, and provide technical support and monitoring 
of the implementation processes. Local Governments, on the other hand, shall be 
responsible for implementing national policies and strategies through local development 
plans, taking into consideration their unique local needs, priorities and resources (p. 15). 
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The policy broadly attempts to separate the competencies of the two spheres of government in that it 
reposes policymaking in central government and implementation in local government. This division is 
too simplistic and does not regard the possibility of concurrency of functions between the two. 
Conclusion  
The foregoing discussion highlights that the subject of assignment of functions to local authorities in 
Lesotho continues to be a fairly complex subject which will haunt decentralisation for quite some time. 
Assignment of functions to sub-national structures is essential to any decentralisation project which in 
turn becomes the key pillar of constitutional democracy. As it has been established, local government 
is not the integral theme of the constitution of Lesotho. Section 106 of the constitution only cursorily 
leaves it to parliament to establish local authorities. The weakness with this approach is that the 
separation of local and central spheres of government is a constitutional issue. Thus, the lofty principles 
identified in the Decentralisation Policy can gain better traction if they are elevated to constitutional 
status so changing the balance of power between central and local government. In that sense, assignment 
of functions would not depend on central government but on the constitution itself. This particular 
approach is vindicated by what has happened in Lesotho since the election of local authorities in 2005 
under the Local Government Act 1997. Despite the two Schedules to the 1997 Act assigning functions 
to local authorities, no functions have been concretely transferred from central government to local 
level. Central government ministries still tenaciously hold on to those functions. Consequently, the 
Minister of Local Government in 2015 gazetted certain functions to be transferred by selected 
ministries. There are two problems with this approach; firstly, it is selective, affecting only a few 
ministries. Secondly, the Minister adds new functions on top of the ones already assigned through the 
Schedules to the Act. This is ultra vires as the Minister does not seem to have powers to change, vary 
or add to the schedules to an Act of parliament. Perhaps that is why central government is divided on 
that aspect. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that the assignment of fiscal functions to local authorities is the most difficult 
part in the whole exercise of transferring functions to local authorities. It has been demonstrated above 
that with the exception of MCC, local authorities do not necessarily collect and manage local revenues. 
All the revenues collected locally are remitted to the centre. The central government in turn makes 
capital and recurrent transfers to local authorities. The annual assessments undertaken by the Ministry 
of Local Government in collaboration with development partners reveal a very weak state of fiscal 
decentralisation in the country. It is herein recommended that the country should have specific fiscal 
decentralisation law. The current fiscal decentralisation legal framework based on the Public Financial 
Management and Accountability (PFMA) Act, 2011 fails to adequately guide both spheres of 
government on fiscal decentralisation. As the International Monetary Fund (2016) pointedly argues: 
Implementing fiscal decentralization in a devolved local government form will require, in 
addition to fiscal policy and legislative considerations, the redesign of local authority 
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PFM systems. Specific issues that need to be addressed include: revision of Local Council 
PFM systems; where necessary aligning these PFM system with Central Government 
planning, budgeting, performance monitoring and reporting cycles. 
Equally, the overhaul of the Local Government Act of 1997 following the adoption of the 
Decentralisation Policy (Government of Lesotho 2014) is a welcome development. The new Local 
Government Bill proposes to take the functions out of the Schedules to the Act into the Regulations. 
While the Bill proposes to deepen decentralisation in the country, it is criticisable for taking the 
functions from the Act into Regulations. That is tantamount to watering-down the provisions. 
Functional assignment is central to decentralisation and as such deserves space at constitutional level. 
With the mooted constitutional reforms, the country should recast central–local relations in the new 
constitution. 
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